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\A pessimist sees the diculty in every opportunity; an
optimist sees the opportunity in every diculty."
Winston Churchill (1874{1965)
ABSTRACT
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used
to model markets and social interactions. In many real-life
problems the utility of an agent is inuenced not only by
their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents
make. Such an inuence is called an externality. Whereas
fully expressive representations of externalities in matchings
require exponential space, in this paper we propose a com-
pact model of externalities, in which the inuence of a match
on each agent is computed additively. Under this framework,
we analyze many-to-many matchings and one-to-one match-
ings where agents take dierent attitudes when reasoning
about the actions of others. In particular, we study opti-
mistic, neutral and pessimistic attitudes and provide both
computational hardness results and polynomial-time algo-
rithms for computing stable outcomes.
Keywords
Matchings, Externalities, Coalitional Games
General Terms
Algorithms, Economics, Theory
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Articial Intelligence]: Multiagent
Systems; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Eco-
nomics
1. INTRODUCTION
Matching games are an important theoretical abstraction
which have been extensively studied in several elds, includ-
ing economics, combinatorial optimization and computer sci-
ence. Matchings are often used to model markets, and exam-
ples include the classic marriage problem, rms and workers,
schools and students, hospitals and medical interns [4].
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Previous matching literature has focused primarily on one-
to-one and one-to-many models [14]. More recently, how-
ever, attention is being paid to more complex models of
many-to-many matchings due to their relevance to real-world
situations [6, 11]. For example, most labour markets in-
volve at least a few many-to-many contracts [6]. More re-
alistic matching models should take into account the fact
that in many settings the utility of an agent is inuenced
not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that
other agents make. Such an inuence is called an externality.
For instance, companies care not only about the employees
they hire themselves, but also about the employees hired
by other companies. This aspect is crucial to how compet-
itive a company is in the market, and so externalities must
be considered in order to completely understand such situa-
tions. While researchers have looked at externalities in one-
to-one matchings (e.g. [9, 15]) and one-to-many matchings
(e.g. [5]), typically fully expressive respresentations for the
externalities were assumed.
1 Modelling matchings with ex-
ternalities is computationally challenging, as fully expressive
representations require exponential space. This motivates
the search for compact representations of externalities.
One of the central questions in matching games is stabil-
ity [14], which informally means that no group of agents can
modify the matching and improve the outcome for them-
selves. In the presence of externalities, stability becomes a
highly complex and challenging phenomenon due to the fact
that a deviation by some agents can aect the utilities of
all other agents in the system. This can invoke a response
that can change the worth of the original deviation dra-
matically, and so any group considering a deviation should
consider all possible responses that can be taken by the re-
maining agents. Evaluating these may be infeasible, par-
ticularly for agents with computational limitations or who
have bounds on their rationality. Motivated by both the co-
operative game theory literature (e.g. [12, 13]), and work on
models of bounded rationality [8], we argue that agents will
use heuristics, which are based on their attitudes (i.e. opti-
mistic, neutral, or pessimistic), to reason about the actions
taken by others.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as fol-
lows. We formulate a compact model of externalities for
matchings, in which the inuence of matches on agents is
computed additively. Second, we consider key stability con-
1An interesting exception is work by Bodine-Baron et
al. which looked at a one-to-many matching problem where
externalities were derived from an underlying social net-
work [2].cepts for matching, under optimistic, neutral and pessimistic
attitudes. We study the computational properties of these
stability concepts, provide both hardness results and poly-
nomial algorithms where applicable, and show how the sta-
bility concepts under dierent attitudes are related to each
other.
2. THE MODEL
Let N = M [ W be the set of agents, where M = fm1;
:::; mjMjg and W = fw1; :::; wjWjg are disjoint. A match,
(m;w), is an edge between two agents m 2 M and w 2
W. We let a matching, A, be a set of all matches. If the
number of allowable matches any agent can participate in is
unrestricted then we say we have a many-to-many matching
problem, while if each agent can participate in at most one
match then we have a one-to-one matching problem. We
assume the formation of a match requires the consent of
both parties, while severing a match can be done unilaterally
by any of its endpoints. The empty matching contains no
matches, while the complete matching contains all possible
matches. A matching game with externalities is dened as
follows:
Definition 1. A matching game with externalities is rep-
resented as a tuple G = (M;W;), where (M;W) is the set
of agents and  is a real valued function such that (Ajz)
is the utility of agent z when matching A forms.
We make no assumptions as to whether the utility of the
agents is transferrable or not and thus Denition 1 can be
viewed as a generalization of assignment games with exter-
nalities [15]. We are interested in settings where an agent's
utility is formed by additive externalities.
Definition 2. A matching game with additive external-
ities is represented as a tuple G = (M;W;), where (M;W)
is the set of agents and  is a real valued function such that
(m;wjz) is the value that agent z receives from the forma-
tion of match (m;w). Given a matching A over N, the util-
ity of an agent z in A is: u(z;A) =
P
(m;w)2A (m;wjz).
Thus, in a matching game with additive externalities, an
agent's utility is the sum of values it receives from matches
it participates in, along with the sum of all externalities
that arise due to the matchings of other agents. We study
additive externalities since they are a conceptually straight-
forward compact representation and assumptions about ad-
ditive utility functions are wide spread throughout the ar-
ticial intelligence and algorithmic game theory literature
(e.g. [1, 2, 3] ).
2.1 Stability Concepts
We are interested in whether matchings are stable and
whether there exist stable matchings given a particular match-
ing game, G. In general, a matching is stable if no subset of
agents has any incentive to reorganize and form new match-
ings amongst themselves. We distinguish between three
standard stability concepts which commonly appear in the
matching literature. The rst, setwise stability, is the most
general and encompasses the other two (corewise stability
and pairwise stability). Unless otherwise noted, the stabil-
ity concept used in this paper is setwise stability, which we
interchangeably refer to as set stability.
Definition 3. Given a matching game G = (M;W;),
a matching A of G is setwise stable if there does not exist
a set of agents B  N, which can improve the utility of at
least one member of B while not degrading the others by:
 rearranging the matches among themselves
 deleting a (possibly empty) subset of the matches with
agents in N n B.
If such a coalition B, exists, it is called a blocking coalition.
Definition 4. Given a matching game G = (M;W;),
a matching A of G is corewise stable if there does not exist
a set of agents B  N, which can improve the utility of at
least one member of B while not degrading the others by:
 rearranging the matches among themselves
 deleting all the matches with agents in N n B.
Definition 5. Given a matching game G = (M;W;)
and a matching A, A is pairwise stable if there does not
exist a blocking coalition of size one or two.
Pairwise stability is most interesting for one-to-one match-
ings. In the context of one-to-one matchings, a blocking
coalition of size one is equivalent to one agent that can im-
prove utility by cutting its matches. A blocking coalition
of size two is equivalent to two agents that can form a new
match with each other while possibly cutting their previous
match (if any), or who can coordinate to cut their existing
matches without forming a new match with each other.
Finally, we note that each member of a blocking coalition
B is required to perform at least one action, by severing a
match with another agent in N, or by forming a new match
with another agent in B. Other denitions of stability could
incorporate dierent layers of deviators, such as agents who
perform the deviation and agents who agree to it without ac-
tively participating. However, such denitions can be prob-
lematic, and require specifying which agents are identied
as deviators and how they should be treated depending on
their role. For this reason, in this paper we only consider
one type of deviators, those who are required to perform at
least one action.
2.2 Agents’ Attitudes
In matching games without externalities, the actions taken
by other agents have only a limited eect on an agent { its
utility depends solely on who it is matched with, and does
not depend on matches involving others. However, if there
are externalities then this is no longer true. The utility of
agent m, for example, can depend on the matches involving
agent w even if (m;w) 62 A. Therefore, we argue, the stabil-
ity concepts need to account for the actions taken by agents
in N n B after a deviation by coalition B. However, it may
be hard to compute the possible reactions to a deviation
since there are potentially an exponential number (i.e. all
possible matchings amongst agents in N n B). Instead, in
this paper we consider several natural heuristics, based on
agents' attitudes, that members of B use to reason about,
and approximate, the reactions to their deviations.
Neutral Attitude: Agents in blocking coalition B have a
neutral attitude if they assume that agents in N n B
will not react to the deviation. All existing matches
amongst non-deviating agents will remain and no new
matches will form.Pessimistic Attitude: Agents in blocking coalition B have
a pessimistic attitude if they assume that the agents in
N nB will take actions so as to punish the members of
B. That is, the non-deviators will cut matches with a
positive inuence on the deviators, and will form any
new matches with a negative inuence on them.
Optimistic Attitude: Agents in blocking coalition B have
an optimistic attitude if they assume that any response
to their deviation will be in their own best interest.
That is, when coalition B considers deviation A
0
from
A, every agent i 2 B evaluates the deviation assuming
the agents in NnB will organize themselves in the best
possible way for i.
Neutrality, optimism and pessimism are heuristics used by
agents in blocking coalition B to reason about the reactions
of others. We make no assumption that the agents in N nB
will actually act in the way expected by members of B, and
it possible that reacting in a neutral/pessimistic/optimistic
way is irrational. Second, it is entirely possible that there are
inconsistencies among the reactions that the members of B
expect from N nB. The optimistic and pessimistic cases are
in fact the best and worst possible reactions to the deviating
agents, respectively. As such, these cases represent upper
and lower bounds on the impact a reaction could have on the
deviating agents. Based on this, we argue that the analysis
of those two particular cases is essential when assessing the
expected reward/risk associated with the deviation.
2.3 Computational Complexity
We are interested in understanding the computational com-
plexity of nding stable outcomes when agents have dierent
attitudes. To address the complexity issues, we look at two
problems in particular; Non-emptiness and Membership.
Definition 6 (Non-Emptiness). Given a matching game
G = (M;W;) and a stability solution concept C, the non-
emptiness question asks whether there exists a matching A
of G which is stable according to C.
Definition 7 (Membership). Given a matching game
G = (M;W;), a matching A of G, and a stability solution
concept C, the membership question asks whether A is stable
according to C.
3. MANY-TO-MANY MATCHINGS
In this section we analyze the stability of many-to-many
matchings using setwise stability as the solution concept and
comparing neutral, optimistic and pessimistic attitudes. In
particular, we analyze the complexity of computing stable
outcomes under dierent attitudes, and describe the rela-
tionship between the dierent setwise stable sets.
3.1 Neutral Stability
We start with examples to provide insight into setwise sta-
bility under neutral attitudes. Our rst example shows that
the neutral stable set can be empty (i.e. there are matching
games which are inherently unstable).
Example 1. Let M = fmg, W = fw1, w2g, and  as fol-
lows: (m;wijm) = 0, (m;wijwi) = ", and (m;w1jw2) =
(m;w2jw1) =  , where  > " > 0. The empty matching
is blocked by (m;w1), f(m;w1), (w2)g is blocked by (m;w2),
f(m;w2);(w1)g is blocked by (m;w1), and f(m;w1);(m;w2)g
is blocked by the empty matching, thus the neutral stable set
is empty.
The next example contrasts the case where the empty
matching belongs to the neutral stable set with the case
where it does not.
Example 2. Let G = (M;W;) be such that (m;wjm) =
(m;wjw) =  " < 0 for all m;w, and (m;wjz) =  > 0
for all z 6= m;w. If "  , the only matching satisfying neu-
tral set stability is the empty matching, since the formation
of any match is very expensive for the participating agents
and not compensated by the utility obtained from the exter-
nalities. Otherwise, if   ", the grand coalition can block
the empty matching through the complete matching, and so
the neutral stable set is empty.
For neutral stability we have the following hardness re-
sults.
Theorem 1. Checking nonemptiness of the neutral stable
set is NP-hard.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the Knapsack prob-
lem. Let I = hU;s;v;B;Ki, where U = fu1;:::;ung is a
nite set, s(u) 2 Z
+ the size of element u 2 U, v(u) 2 Z
+
the value of element u 2 U, B 2 Z
+ a size constraint, and
K 2 Z
+ a value goal, such that U
0
 U is a solution if P
u2U
0 s(u)  B and
P
u2U
0 v(u)  K. We construct a
matching game G such that G has a nonempty stable set if
and only if I has a solution. Let M = fx1;:::;xn;m1;m2g,
W = fy1;:::;yn;wg, and  with non-zero entries:
 (xi;yijm1) =  s(ui) and (xi;yijm2) = v(ui), 8i 2
f1;:::;ng
 (m1;wjm1) =  B
 (m2;wjm2) = K  
P
ui2U v(ui)
 (xj;wjxj) =  1 and (mi;yjjyj) =  1, 8i 2 f1;2g
and 8j 2 f1;:::;ng
Since the instances with
P
ui2U v(ui) < K are trivially solv-
able, we are interested in those cases where
P
ui2U v(ui) 
K, and so (m2;wjm2)  0. If I has a solution U
0
, we
claim the following matching belongs to the stable set: A = S
ui2U
0f(xi;yi)g

[ f(m1);(m2);(w)g (1). First note that
U
0
satises the knapsack conditions, and so the utilities of
the agents in A are: u(m1;A) =
P
ui2U
0 (xi;yijm1) = P
ui2U
0  s(ui)   B, u(m2;A) =
P
ui2U
0 (xi;yijm2) = P
ui2U
0 v(ui)  K, and u(xi;A) = u(yi;A) = u(w;A) =
0;8i 2 f1;:::;ng.
All the agents, except possibly for m1 and m2, obtain
their best possible utility in A. Thus any blocking coalition,
B, would have to contain at least one of m1 and m2. Since
blocking requires each member of B to perform an action,
it follows that m1, m2 can only be involved in blocking A
by forming a new match. Recall that (mi;yjjyj) =  1,
and so agents yj will never accept a match with either m1
or m2. Thus the only matches that m1 and m2 could form,
if deviating, are (m1;w) and (m2;w), respectively.
The best utility that m1 can get when matched with w is
attained in A1 = f(m1;w), (x1), :::, (xn), (y1), :::, (yn),(m2)g: u(m1;A1) = (m1;wjm1) =  B  u(m1;A) (2),
where the candidate for the blocking coalition is B1 = fm1;wg
[
S
ui2U
0fxi;yig

.
The best utility that m2 can get when matched with w
is attained in A2 = f(m2;w), (x1;y1), :::, (xn;yn), (m1)g:
u(m2;A2) = (m2;wjm2) +
Pn
i=1 (xi;yijm2) = (K 
P
ui2U v(ui)

+
P
ui2U v(ui) = K  u(m2;A) (3), where
the candidate for the blocking coalition is B2 = fm2;wg [ S
ui62U
0fxi;yig

. From inequalities (2) and (3), m1 and m2
cannot improve by deviating from A. Since the other agents
have no incentive to deviate, it follows that A belongs to the
stable set.
Conversely, if the stable set of G is non-empty, let A be
a stable matching. First note that A must satisfy neutral
individual rationality, and so it cannot contain any match
with negative value for one of the endpoints. Thus the only
non-zero matches that can be included in A are a subset
of
S
ui2Uf(xi;yi)g

. In addition, any matches of the form
(xi;yj), with i 6= j, can be removed from A without losing
stability. Thus without loss of generality, A can be writ-
ten as in Equation (1) for some U
0
 U. From A stable,
coalitions f(m1;w)g and f(m2;w)g are not blocking, thus
Inequalities (2) and (3) hold. Equivalently, the knapsack
conditions are satised, and so U
0
is a solution.
Theorem 2. Checking neutral stable set membership is
coNP-complete.
Proof. We show that the complementary problem, of
deciding whether a matching does not belong to the stable
set of a game, is NP-complete. Given matching A, one can
nondeterministically guess pair hB;A
0
i such that matching
A is blocked by coalition B through matching A
0
. To verify
that hB;A
0
i is blocking for A, it is sucient to compute, for
each z 2 B, its utility in A and A
0
(assuming that N n B
does not react to the deviation).
To prove hardness, we provide a reduction from Knap-
sack [7]. A Knapsack instance has the form I = hU;s;v;B;Ki,
where U = fu1;:::;ung is a nite set, s(u) 2 Z
+ the size
of element u 2 U, v(u) 2 Z
+ the value of element u 2 U,
B 2 Z
+ a size constraint, and K 2 Z
+ a value goal. Let G =
(M;W;) be a matching game with M = fx1;:::;xn;m1;m2g,
W = fy1;:::;yn;w1;w2g, and  with non-zero entries:
 (xi;yijm1) =  s(ui), (xi;yijw1) = v(ui), 8i  n
 (m2;w2jm1) =  B   " and (m2;w2jw1) = K   ",
for some 0 < " < 1
 (m1;wjw) = (m;w1jm) =  1, for all w 2 W nfw1g
and m 2 M n fm1g
Let A = f(m2;w2);(m1);(w1);(x1);:::;(xn);(y1);:::;(yn)g,
with utilities:
 u(xi;A) = (m2;w2jxi) = 0 and u(yi;A) = (m2,
w2jyi) = 0, 8i 2 f1;:::;ng
 u(m1;A) = (m2;w2jm1) =  B   "
 u(w1;A) = (m2;w2jw1) = K   "
 u(m2;A) = (m2;w2jm2) = 0
 u(w2;A) = (m2;w2jw2) = 0
All the agents except m1 and w1 obtain their maximum util-
ity in A. In addition, m1 or w1 can only block by forming
the match (m1;w1), since all other matches with one of these
agents as an endpoint are unfeasible. We claim that I has a
solution if and only if A has a blocking coalition. If I has so-
lution U
0
 U, consider the grand coalition N and matching:
A
0
=
S
ui2U
0f(xi;yi)g

[
S
ui62U
0f(xi;yi+1);(xi+1;yi)g

[f(m1;w1);(m2);(w2)g, where xn+1 = x1 and yn+1 = y1.
The utilities of the agents in A
0
are:
 u(xi;A
0
) = 0 and u(yi;A
0
) = 0, 8i 2 f0;:::;ng
 u(m1;A
0
) =  
P
ui2U
0 s(ui)   B >  B   " =
u(m1;A)
 u(w1;A
0
) =
P
ui2U
0 v(ui)  K > K   " = u(w1;A)
 u(m2;A
0
) = u(w2;A
0
) = 0
Thus the grand coalition is blocking under neutrality, since
it can form matching A
0
and (weakly) improve the utilities
of all its members by doing so.
Conversely, assume A is blocked by a coalition B through
a matching A
0
. Note that all the agents except m1 and w1,
obtain their maximum possible utility in A. Agent m1 can-
not block without agent w1, since all other matches (m1;w),
for w 6= w1 are unfeasible; similarly for w1. Thus any
blocking coalition must include agents m1;w1 and match
(m1;w1). In addition, for one of m1, w1 to strictly im-
prove after the deviation, the edge (m2;w2) must be re-
moved from A
0
. The conditions for improvement in A
0
are:
(a) u(m1;A
0
) =
P
(xi;yi)2A
0 (xi;yijm1) =
P
(xi;yi)2A
0  s(ui)
 u(m1;A) =  B   " and (b) u(w1;A
0
) =
P
(xi;yi)2A
0
(xi;yijw1) =
P
(xi;yi)2A
0 v(ui)  u(w1;A) = K   ": Since
v(ui) and s(ui) are integers, Inequalities (a) and (b) are
equivalent to
P
(xi;yi)2A
0 s(ui)  B and
P
(xi;yi)2A
0 v(ui)
 K. Thus U
0
= fui 2 U j(xi;yi) 2 A
0
g is a solution for
the I instance.
3.2 Pessimistic Stability
We now investigate stability when agents have a pessimistic
attitude. We rst note that neutral and pessimistic atti-
tudes can lead to quite dierent stable matchings. Exam-
ple 2 showed that the neutral stable set was empty whenever
  ", but it is not hard to show that the pessimistic stable
set is non-empty for this example. However, the pessimistic
stable set can still be empty as can be seen from the follow-
ing example.
Example 3. Let G = (M;W;) with M = fx1, x2, m1,
m2g, W = fy1, y2, w1, w2g, and (x1;y1jm1) =  3,
(x2;y2jm1) =  5, (x1;y1jm2) = 2, (x2;y2jm2) = 10,
(m1;w1jm1) =  4, (m2;w2jm2) =  7, and (mi;yjjyj) =
 1, (xi;wjjxi) =  1, 8i;j 2 f1;2g.
Even though there is a dierence between neutral and pes-
simistic stable sets, the complexity of checking non-emptiness
and membership for the two heuristics is the same.
Theorem 3. Checking nonemptiness of the pessimistic
stable set is NP-hard.
Theorem 4. Checking pessimistic stable set membership
is coNP-complete.3.3 Optimistic Stability
When agents have optimistic attitudes, they believe that
outcomes will always turn out in the best possible way. This
positive outlook provides enough structure to characterize
optimistic stable sets.
Theorem 5. Any matching in the optimistic stable set is
a union of two disjoint matchings (M
0
;W
0
) [ (M
00
;W
00
),
where M
0
[ M
00
= M, W
0
[ W
00
= W, and every agent in
(M
0
;W
0
) obtains their highest possible utility, while (M
00
;W
00
)
is the empty matching.
Proof. Let A be a matching in the optimistic setwise-
stable set and z an agent . Since A is stable, z is not block-
ing. Thus it must be that z is either unmatched, case in
which he cannot deviate, or z is matched but already ob-
tains the highest possible utility, and so has no incentive to
deviate. Thus N can be partitioned in two subsets, N
0
, the
agents that obtain in A their maximal utility, and N
00
, the
unmatched agents.
The next two results immediately follow from Theorem 5.
Corollary 1. Assume that (m;wji) < 0 for all m;w;i 2
N. The unique candidate for the optimistic stable set is the
empty matching.
Corollary 2. Assume that (m;wji)  0 for all m;w;i 2
N. The only candidates for the optimistic stable set are the
empty and complete matchings.
Theorem 5 describes the structure of the optimistic sta-
ble set, if it is non-empty. Unfortunately it does not say
anything about whether the set is non-empty, and like with
neutral and pessimistic stable sets, it remains hard to deter-
mine nonemptiness of the optimistic stable set.
Theorem 6. Checking nonemptiness of the optimistic sta-
ble set is NP-complete.
Proof. First note that checking nonemptiness of the op-
timistic setwise-stable set is in NP. Given a matching A,
the utility of each agent z 2 N in A can be computed in
O(n
2). In addition, for every pair (m;w) 2 (M;W), we can
again compute in O(n
2) the best case utilities of m and w
when matched with each other. Verifying if A is stable can
be done by iterating over all pairs (m;w) and checking in
O(1) if both m and w can (weakly) improve by deviating un-
der optimism, compared to their current utility in A. The
reduction is similar to that in Theorem 1.
Unlike with neutral and pessimistic attitudes, checking
membership under optimistic attitudes can be done in poly-
nomial time.
Theorem 7. Checking membership to the optimistic sta-
ble set is in P.
Proof. Let A be a matching which can be blocked by a
coalition B through some deviation A
0
. Assume there ex-
ists agent z 2 B which can strictly improve the optimistic
estimation of utility only by cutting matches in A
0
. Then
z can deviate alone by cutting the same matches as in A
0
while expecting that the rest of the agents in B will per-
form deviation A
0
(including initiating matches with z as
an endpoint). Otherwise, any deviator which strictly im-
proves utility forms a new match. Let z be such an agent
and (z;z
0
) a new edge in A
0
. Then coalition fz;z
0
g can
block by forming the edge (z;z
0
), since both agents z and z
0
expect that the edges in A
0
will form after the deviation.
3.4 Relationship Between Attitudes
We saw, through examples that the neutral and pessimistic
stable sets were not the same, and the characterization of the
optimistic stable set indicated that it also diered from the
others. What was unclear was whether there is any direct
relationship between the sets. In this section we explicitly
answer that question in the armative. Given a many-to-
many matching game G, denote by O-set(G), N-set(G), and
P-set(G) the optimistic, neutral, and pessimistic stable sets.
Theorem 8. Given any matching game G, the following
inclusions hold O-set(G)  N-set(G)  P-set(G).
Proof. Let B denote a potentially blocking coalition. If
a matching belongs to the optimistic set, then B cannot hope
to improve even when the rest of the agents organize them-
selves in the best possible way for B. Thus the optimistic
set is included in all the other stable sets. If a matching
belongs to the pessimistic set, then B cannot improve when
the rest of the society will punish them maximally for the
deviation. Under the other stability concepts, B assumes a
potentially better reaction from N n B. Thus if B's devia-
tion is not protable in the optimistic or neutral scenarios,
it is also not protable in the pessimistic scenario. Hence
the pessimistic set contains all the other sets.
4. ONE-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
We analyze one-to-one matchings from a neutral, opti-
mistic and pessimistic standpoint just as was done with the
many-to-many matchings. However, before we proceed we
comment on the choice of stability concept used for one-to-
one matchings. In particular, in one-to-one matchings, the
setwise stable set coincides exactly with the core since agents
in a deviating group must necessarily cut all matches with
non-members of the deviating group due to the constraint
on the number of allowable partners. Thus, while we con-
tinue to use the term stable set to mean the setwise stable
set, readers more comfortable with the core solution concept
can apply it in this section. We also investigate pairwise sta-
bility and explicitly state we are looking at pairwise stability
when warranted.
4.1 Neutral Stability
The hardness results in one-to-one matchings parallel the
ones in the many-to-many setting.
Theorem 9. Checking neutral stable set membership is
coNP-complete.
Theorem 10. Checking nonemptiness of the neutral sta-
ble set is NP-hard.
We also study pair-wise stability under the neutral as-
sumption. We rst note that there is a separation between
the neutral pairwise stable set and the neutral setwise stable
set.
Example 4. Let G = (M;W, ), where M = fm1;m2g,
W = fw1;w2g, and (mi;wjjmi) = (mi;wjjwj) =  ",(mi;wjjz) = W  " > 0, where z 2 N n fmi;wjg, 8i;j 2
f1;2g. The neutral stable set of G is empty, while the\empty"
matching is pairwise stable.
While, in general, the neutral pairwise stable set may be
empty, under certain conditions it is non-empty and we can
compute a stable matching in polynomial time.
Theorem 11. A neutral pairwise stable matching can be
computed in polynomial time when   0.
Proof. Let A be the matching returned by running the
Gale-Shapley algorithm by ignoring externalities, and as-
sume by contradiction A is not stable. Then there exists
deviation (m;w
0
), where m;w are matched in A with w
0
;m
0
,
respectively. Let ext(m;A) denote the value obtained by m
in A from externalities, and Em(w) = (m;wjm). From
fm;w
0
g blocking, u(m;A) = (m;wjm) + ext(m;A) <
(m;w
0
jm)+ ext(m;A)   (m
0
;w
0
jm) and u(w
0
;A) =
(m
0
;w
0
jw
0
) + ext(w
0
;A) < (m;w
0
jw
0
) + ext(w
0
;A)  
(m;wjw
0
). Equivalently, (i) (m;wjm) < (m;w
0
jm)  
(m
0
;w
0
jm)  (m;w
0
jm) and (ii) (m
0
;w
0
jw
0
) <
(m;w
0
jw
0
)   (m;wjw
0
)  (m;w
0
jw
0
). From (i);(ii),
Em(w) < Em(w
0
) and Ew
0(m
0
) < Ew
0(m), and so (m;w
0
)
is blocking under the preferences given by E. Contradiction,
since A is stable on (M;W;E).
The assumption that  is non-negative is necessary for
the above result since the neutral pairwise-stable set can be
empty when  can be negative.
Example 5. Let G = (M;W;), where M = fm1;m2g,
W = fw1;w2g, and  as follows: (mi;wjjmi) = 1 and
(mi;wjjwj) = 1, for all i;j 2 f1;2g, and (mi;wjjz) =
 1, for all i;j 2 f1;2g and z 6= mi;wj. All the edges have
positive values for their endpoints, and so the only candi-
dates for neutral pairwise stability are: A1 = f(m1;w1);(m2;w2)g
and A2 = f(m1;w2);(m2;w1)g. However, matching A1 is
blocked by the pair (m1;w2), and A2 is blocked by (m1;w1).
4.2 Pessimistic Stability
For pessimistic stability, we obtain similar results to the
ones for neutrality when considering setwise stability.
Theorem 12. Checking pessimistic stable set membership
is coNP-complete.
Theorem 13. Checking nonemptiness of the pessimistic
stable set is NP-hard.
Pessimistic pairwise stable matchings can be computed in
polynomial time when   0.
Theorem 14. A pessimistic pairwise stable set can be
computed in polynomial time when  is non-negative.
Proof. A neutral pairwise stable matching can be com-
puted in polynomial time when   0, and any matching
satisfying neutral pairwise stability also satises pessimistic
pairwise stability.
In one-to-one matchings with non-negative , we can also
consider a restricted notion of pessimism. Namely, any match-
ing containing singletons (unmatched agents) can weakly im-
prove everyone's utility by pairing the singletons with each
Input: G = (M;W;)
Output: Stable matching with ties broken arbitrarily
forall the z 2 N do
if z 2 M then
Opp(z) = W
else
Opp(z) = M
foreach t 2 Opp(z) do
M
0
  M n fz;tg
W
0
  W n fz;tg
foreach (m;w) 2 M
0
 W
0
do
 (m;w)   (m;wjz)
end
// Compute A
 , the worst case matching for z
// when paired with t
A
    Min-Matching(M
0
;W
0
; )
E
 
z (t)   (z;tjz)
foreach (m;w) 2 A
  do
E
 
z (t)   E
 
z (t) +  (m;w)
end
end
end
return Gale-Shapley(M;W;E
 )
Algorithm 1: (Restricted) Pessimistic Pairwise Stabil-
ity.
other. Based on this observation, the pessimistic deviators
can have a less extreme attitude, and assume that while the
rest of the agents may punish them for the deviation, they
will not stay unmatched in order to do so. In other words, a
blocking coalition, B, assumes that the agents in N nB form
the worst possible matching for B, among all the matchings
of size min(jM \ (N n B)j;jW \ (N n B)j).
Theorem 15. A restricted pessimistic pairwise stable mat-
ching can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let A be the matching returned by Algorithm 1
and assume by contradiction A is unstable under pessimistic
pairwise stability. Then there exists deviating pair (m;w
0
),
where m;w are matched in A with m
0
;w
0
, respectively.
Then it must be the case that for any possible matching
A
0
(m;w
0
) that includes the pair (m;w
0
), both m and w
0
are
better o in A
0
(m;w
0
) than in A. Equivalently, E
 
m(w
0
) >
u(m;A)  E
 
m(w) and E
 
w
0(m) > u(w
0
;A)  E
 
w
0(m
0
).
However, A is stable under E
 , and so for any (m;w
0
) 62 A,
either E
 
m(w
0
)  E
 
m(w
0
) or E
 
w
0(m
0
)  E
 
w
0(m), contradic-
tion. Thus A is stable.
4.3 Optimistic Stability
Since checking membership under optimistic attitudes was
polynomial for many-to-many matchings, and one-to-one
matchings are a special case, it trivially follows that checking
membership under optimistic attitudes remains in P when
considering one-to-one matchings. This continues to be true
when we make the further restriction to pair-wise stability.
Thus, we focus our attention to checking non-emptiness of
stable sets under optimistic attitudes.
Theorem 16. Checking nonemptiness of the optimistic
stable set is NP-complete, even if   0.Proof. First note that similarly to the optimistic setwise-
stable set, checking nonemptiness of the optimistic stable
set is in NP. Given a matching A, the utility of each agent
z 2 N in A can be computed in O(n
2). In addition, for ev-
ery pair (m;w) 2 (M;W), we can again compute in O(n
2)
the best case utilities of m and w when matched with each
other. Verifying if A is stable can be done by iterating over
all pairs (m;w) and checking in O(1) if both m and w can
(weakly) improve by deviating under optimism, compared
to their current utility in A. The same reduction as in The-
orem 1 applies, by noting that the weights are constructed
such that any feasible matching (from the perspective of the
xi and yi agents) is one-to-one.
For the next theorem, we consider the weak optimistic
stable set. Weak stability requires that all members of a
blocking coalition strictly improve their utility in order for
the deviation to take place. We show that this is equivalent
to pair-wise stability with optimistic attitudes.
Theorem 17. The optimistic pair-wise stable set is equiv-
alent to the weak optimistic stable set.
Proof. Let A be a one-to-one matching. We show that
if A has a blocking coalition B under optimism, then there
exists a blocking singleton or pair. We consider two cases.
If there exists z 2 B which improves strictly in A
0
only
by severing a match. Then agent z can deviate alone, by
simply cutting the same match as in A
0
, and expecting (op-
timistically) that the rest of the agents will react as in A
0
.
Otherwise, there exists z 2 B which improves strictly by
forming a new match, say (z;z
0
), and possibly severing an
existing match. Then coalition fz;z
0
g is blocking. Thus if A
does not belong to the weak optimistic stable set, it is also
not pairwise stable under optimism. The reverse direction is
clear, and so the optimistic pairwise stable set is equivalent
to the weak optimistic stable set.
Corollary 3. Checking nonemptimess of the optimistic
pairwise set is NP-complete, even when   0.
This is in contrast with neutral and pessimistic attitudes in
one-to-one matchings. Recall that for neutrality and pes-
simism, Algorithm 1 computes a pairwise stable matching.
In the case of neutrality, a pairwise stable matching can be
computed by eectively ignoring externalities and running
the Gale-Shapley algorithm on the preferences given by the
values on the direct edges between every two agents. In the
case of pessimism, each agent i attaches to every other agent
j the worst possible value when paired with j. Computing
a pairwise stable outcome based on the preferences given by
these worst case values results in a stable matching.
On the other hand, in the case of optimism, while the
agents can attach the best possible values to each other, a
matching computed based on these best case values may be
unstable. Some agents may actually not achieve their best
case value when paired to their favourite other agent, due to
externalities. Thus a stable matching should simultaneously
satisfy more precise conditions, and verifying the existence
of such a matching is not done in polynomial time.
5. DISCUSSION
In this work we introduced a compact model for matching
problems with externalities, and looked at various stabil-
ity concepts when agents held dierent attitudes concern-
ing how they expected others to react to their actions. In
particular, we analyzed both many-to-many matchings and
one-to-one matchings when agents held neutral, pessimistic
or optimistic attitudes. We studied the computational com-
plexity of nding stable outcomes and provided both hard-
ness results and polynomial algorithms where possible. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes our ndings.
The attitudes taken by the agents meaningfully change
stable outcomes and inuence the complexity of nding these
outcomes. Using optimistic and pessimistic attitudes can
really be viewed as determining what the best and worst
possible reactions to a deviation and so can be seen as types
of upper and lower bounds on the impact a reaction has on
the deviating agents. The complexity results help illustrate
how eective these heuristics may or may not be, if they
were to be incorporated into algorithms searching for stable
matchings.
There are several directions in which this work can be
extended. First, alternative attitudes could be explored.
However, we note that our notion of optimism is the simplest
model under which checking non-emptiness in NP-hard. The
non-emptiness question for renements of optimism, such as
having agents not expect others to oer them direct pos-
itive connections in response to a deviation, remains NP-
hard. Additionally, membership can become hard under re-
nements where agents use more sophisticated reasoning.
One could also explore alternative models of group stability.
One obvious model stipulates that group deviations should
be Pareto improving. However, checking the existence of a
Pareto improving deviation is NP-hard, and so the rene-
ment does not signicant additional insight into the match-
ing problem.
2
We investigated many-to-many matchings and one-to-one
matchings as these can be viewed as the two extremes of
matching problems. Studying how agents' attitudes inu-
ence one-to-many matchings is an obvious next step. We
hypothesize that the results would be very similar as to those
presented here, but it would be interesting to see whether
adding the restriction that   0 would make the underlying
matching problem easier as it did for one-to-one matchings
under certain circumstances. Second, we assumed that all
deviating agents maintained the same attitude, be it neutral,
optimistic or pessimistic. It would be interesting, though
challenging, to see what happens with hybrid models where,
for example, a certain percentage of agents maintained a
particular attitude.
Finally, there are other domains where externalities are
important, such as in network formation games [10]. The
investigation of real social networks could reveal interesting
patterns in the externalities (do the values on the edges tend
to be clustered in a certain way?). Even on platforms such as
Facebook, agents are inuenced by the matchings of others
(friendships, subscriptions). Such cumulative eects can be
expressed with additive externalities and insights from the
data may suggest specialized instances of the weighted graph
model, that tend to arise in the real world. Since such games
can involve very large numbers of agents, investigating ap-
propriate compact representations for externalities, compu-
tationally feasible stability concepts and appropriate models
for the rationality bounds of the agents are all important and
timely.
2This can be seen from the proof of Theorem 2. The grand
coalition would have to nd a Pareto improving matching,
which coincides with a Knapsack solution.Neutral Pessimistic Optimistic
Many-to-Many Membership coNP-complete coNP-complete P
Setwise Stability Non-Emptiness NP-hard NP-hard NP-complete
One-to-One Membership coNP-complete coNP-complete P
Setwise Stability Non-Emptiness NP-hard NP-hard NP-complete
One-to-One Membership P P P
Pairwise Stability (  0) Non-Emptiness P P NP-complete
Table 1: Summary of complexity results.
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8. APPENDIX
Additional proofs are provided for completeness.
Theorem 3. Checking nonemptiness of the pessimistic
stable set is NP-hard.
Proof. The same reduction as in Theorem 1 applies, by
noting that a coalition is blocking for the constructed match-
ing under pessimistic reasoning if and only if it is blocking
under neutral reasoning.
Theorem 9. Checking neutral stable set membership is
coNP-complete.
Proof. The same reduction as in Theorem 2 applies, by
noting that the weights are set such that any feasible match-
ing (from the perspective of the xi and yi agents) is one-to-
one. That is, a coalition can block the matching constructed
in Theorem 2 if and only if it is a one-to-one matching.
Theorem 10. Checking nonemptiness of the neutral sta-
ble set is NP-hard.
Proof. The same reduction as in Theorem 1 applies, by
noting that the weights are set up such that any feasible
matching (from the perspective of the xi and yi agents) is
one-to-one, and so a matching of the game in Theorem 1 is
stable if and only if it is a one-to-one matching.
Theorem 12. Checking pessimistic stable set membership
is coNP-complete.
Proof. The reduction is similar to that of Theorem 1,
except for the addition of several dummy agents to ensure
that the grand coalition can always block in the one-to-
one setting when the Knapsack instance has a solution.
Given I = hU;s;v;B;Ki, let G = (M;W;) such that
M = fx1;:::;x2n;m1;m2g, W = fy1;:::;y2n;wg, and 
with non-zero entries:
 (xi;yijm1) = (xi;yn+ijm1) =  s(ui) and (xi;yijw)
= (xi;yn+ijw) = v(ui), 8i 2 f1;:::;ng
 (m1;wjm1) =  B
 (m2;wjm2) = K  
P
ui2U v(ui)
 (xj;wjxj) =  1 and (mi;yjjyj) =  1, 8i 2 f1;2g
and 8j 2 f1;:::;2ng
Let A = f(m1);(m2); (w); (x1); :::; (x2n), (y1),:::; (y2n)g.
Similarly to Theorem 1, A belongs to the pessimistic stable
set if and only if the Knapsack instance has a solution.